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Fiscal rules were supposed to provide a simple remedy for out-of-
control government spending. They were predicated on a deep skepticism
about the capacity of democratic systems to exercise fiscal self-control.
After three decades of experimentation, it is evident that advocates of
fiscal rules overestimated the capacity of legal instruments to impose
discipline on democratic processes. Certainly, many advanced
democracies have improved their fiscal performance-but fiscal rules
have played a small role in this process. Experience suggests that
advocates of fiscal rules drew the wrong lessons from the experience of
the 1970s, and underestimated the capacity of democratic systems to
respond constructively to fiscal crises.




A fiscal rule is a legal instrument that intends to limit what
democratically elected governments can do in terms of spending, taxing,
and borrowing.2 In this paper we are only interested in fiscal rules
affecting national governments. Such rules vary in form. They may be
* Alasdair Roberts is a Professor of Public Affairs at the Truman School of Public
Affairs, University of Missouri. He is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public
Administration and a public member of the Administrative Conference of the United
States. His website is http://www.aroberts.us.
1. MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFr 35 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., Peter Putnam
trans., 1953).
2. See generally GEORGE KOPITS & STEVEN SYMANSKY, FIscAL PoLicY RULES 2-4
(Int'l Monetary Fund ed., 1998) (assumes that fiscal rules permanently constrain fiscal
policy in terms of overall fiscal performance).
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contained in treaties-like the Treaty on European Union of 1992 and
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance of 2012-which
attempt to limit borrowing by countries that use the euro as their
currency. 3 Or they may be contained in national constitutions, like the
provision in Singapore's basic law that promotes budget balance over
the five-year term of a government. 4 Or they may be contained in
legislation-like the Budget Control Act of 2011, which was intended to
force reductions in spending by the United States Congress over the
following decade. 5 Or they may be contained in high-profile statements,
like the three-year commitments on expenditure levels that the Swedish
government began to publish in 1997.6 As these examples suggest, fiscal
rules also vary in purpose. They may limit expenditures, deficits, or
total debt, and they may measure these variables in terms of national
currency or as a share of GDP.
7
This meaning of the phrase "fiscal rule" was unknown before the
neoliberal age-that is, the period that began with the pro-market
policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. There were certainly
experiments with legal constraints on national fiscal policy in some
places before 1980, as well as scholarly work that laid out the argument
for such constraints; however, the idea that national governments
should be bound by fiscal rules only became fashionable in many
countries after 1980, and particularly after the early 1990s.8 These rules
were seen as a remedy for a grave defect in the structure of advanced
democracies, which were believed to have a tendency toward increasing
expenditures and indebtedness. 9 Democracies that were otherwise
incapable of controlling themselves would be constrained by
constitutions, statutes, or treaties. Advocates of fiscal rules combined
skepticism about the self-denying capacities of democratic systems with
3. See TEU art. 104 (as in effect 1993) (now TFEU art. 126); Treaty of Lisbon
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, protocol 12, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon];
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,
art. 3, Mar. 2, 2012 [hereinafter TSCG].
4. See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE Aug. 9, 1965, Part XI (142).
5. See generally Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011)
(outlining several measures aimed at deficit reduction).
6. See Gtsta Ljungman, The Medium-Term Fiscal Framework in Sweden, 6 OECD J.
ON BUDGETING 1, 4 (2007).
7. See Andrea Schaechter et al., Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis-Toward the
'Next Generation' Rules. A New Dataset, 7-10 (IMF Working Paper No. 12/187, 2012).
8. ALEX ALASDAIR, THE LOGIC OF DISCIPLINE: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT 57-64 (2010).
9. Id. at 48-49.
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a deep faith in the power of the law to regulate the politics of taxing and
spending. 10
The era of unabashed neoliberalism ended with the advent of the
global financial crisis in 2008. By then, the world had three decades of
discouraging experience with national fiscal rules. The results were not
encouraging for advocates of fiscal constraints. Many governments had
carefully avoided fiscal rules that would constrict their discretion over
spending, taxing, and borrowing. Some governments learned how to
evade their own rules, or decided to modify or abandon them when they
became inconvenient. Other governments that were already pursuing
austerity policies adopted fiscal rules for purely symbolic reasons. The
results of these three decades were not entirely disappointing: many
governments had improved their budgetary behavior, but there was no
clear evidence that fiscal rules had caused them to do it.
The doctrine that surrounded fiscal rules proved to be misguided in
two respects. The first error, clearly, was its assumption that the
discretion of national governments could be effectively contained
through legal instruments. The second, more fundamental, error was
that proponents of fiscal rules looked at the behavior of advanced
democracies at a specific moment in history, and derived a highly
abstracted and pessimistic view about the character of democratic
politics. A more accurate reading of history accounts for the particular
conditions that encouraged a loss of fiscal discipline in the 1970s and
early 1980s. It also recognizes how the advanced democracies adapted to
manage that problem, through a long process of ideational as well as
institutional change.
Fiscal rules are included within a set of institutional innovations
that were widely adopted in the neoliberal age and which are frequently
regarded as constraints on democratic politics.'1 This paper suggests a
more encouraging view of recent history: fiscal rules were not imposed
as constraints on democratic politics; rather, they were used (and often
abused) by democratic polities in a complicated process of adjustment to
new economic and social realities. Democratic states have not
surrendered their capability to abandon or evade such rules when it
seems to be in the national interest. In the long run, enthusiasm for
fiscal rules may fade. We may begin to recognize this wave of
experimentation with fiscal rules as a distinct historical phenomenon, a
10. Id. at 57-64.
11. Central bank independence is another example of reforms within this set. See
generally ALASDAIR ROBERTS, THE LOGIC OF DISCIPLINE: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE
ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2010) (arguing that governmental reform, occurring
from 1978 to 1980, resulted in economic liberalization and a simultaneous constraint on
the role of government).
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small part of a much larger story about democratic adaptation to the
realities of fiscal stress.
I. THE RISE OF THE SIMPLE Fix: PUBLIC CHOICE
Before the 1980s, a "fiscal rule" was usually understood to mean a
rule of thumb or guideline that might be applied to governmental taxing
and spending, particularly in the context of the attempt to steer the
overall performance of a national economy. Most experts did not
seriously contemplate the possibility that governments might adopt
legal constraints on fiscal policy. The shift in understandings about the
meaning of the phrase, and about the wisdom of legal constraints, was
the result of three intellectual and political projects: one American, one
primarily German, and one closely associated with supranational
institutions such as the European Commission and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). All three of these projects shared a common
skepticism about the trustworthiness of democratic processes, and they
shared a faith in the power of the law to regulate politics.
The intellectual leaders of the American project were a small group
of academics, initially based at the University of Virginia, whose aim
was to apply economic modes of analysis to political and bureaucratic
decision making. Two leaders of this group were James Buchanan and
Gordon Tullock, who arrived at the University of Virginia in 1956-1957.
The school of thought that they helped to establish eventually became
known as Public Choice. It was built on two assumptions. The first
assumption was that individuals and groups within government acted
just as they did in the marketplace with a keen interest in advancing
their own material interests. "The basic behavioral postulate," said
Dennis C. Mueller, "is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility
maximizer."'12 The second assumption was that the behavior of
individuals and groups is shaped principally by formal rules that define
what they can or cannot do as they pursue their interests. Buchanan
was heavily influenced by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell, who
also worked on the axiom that "legal structures" were the only effective
way of guiding individual behavior. 13 Tullock, trained as a lawyer, was
also sympathetic to this view.' 4 The effect of combining these two
assumptions was to produce a view of government as a simple, formal
12. DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 1-2 (3rd ed. 2003).
13. KNUT WICKSELL & LIONEL ROBBINS, LECTURES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 5
(Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. ed., E. Classen trans., 1934).
14. Gordon L. Brady & Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock: Creative Maverick of Public
Choice, 71 PUB. CHOICE 141, 142 (1991).
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game, with very little that is high-minded about it. "Policy outcomes," a
student of Buchanan's later wrote,
are treated as being a more or less "natural" product of
people pursuing their interests through political
processes, as this pursuit is shaped and constrained by
constitutional rules. Undesirable or inefficient outcomes,
then, call for constitutional remedy and not for
exhortation to do better, to elect more qualified officials,
to be less human, or to follow other similar nostrums.15
Public Choice scholars quickly formed the opinion that the game of
democratic politics tended to encourage the overproduction of public
services. Politicians had an incentive to make large promises to win the
next election. Bureaucrats in public agencies had an incentive to
promote new programs so that they could increase their budgets and
perquisites. Special interest groups had an incentive to lobby for
privileges whose costs could be loaded onto the shoulders of less-
organized taxpayers. And voters, in general, had an incentive to press
politicians for benefits whose costs could be transferred, by borrowing,
to future generations. In sum, the governmental machine was built in
such a way that steady expansion was inevitable. Growth was the result
of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters engaging in their "natural
proclivities" within the rules of the democratic game. 16 This defect of the
democratic process was "inherent and universal."
17
It is probably not surprising that Buchanan himself developed an
early and intense antipathy toward the Keynesian approach on
macroeconomic management, a theory that became influential after the
Second World War. Keynesian economists condoned borrowing by
governments to finance new programs during periods of economic
decline. The premise was that governments would repay these debts
when the economy recovered. But Buchanan was skeptical: he believed
that Keynesians, by dispelling the stigma that traditionally surrounded
debt-financed expenditure, had created a new "bias toward extended
public expenditure."' 8 Politicians would borrow too much during
15. Richard E. Wagner, The Calculus of Consent: A Wicksellian Retrospective, 56 PUB.
CHOICE 153, 153 (1988).
16. James M. Buchanan, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments,
90 PUB. CHOICE 117, 120 (1997) [hereinafter Buchanan, Balanced Budget].
17. William C. Mitchell, Virginia, Rochester and Bloomington: Twenty-Five Years of
Public Choice and Political Science, 56 PUB. CHOICE 101, 107 (1988).
18. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN, VOL. 2
PUBLIC PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC DEBT: A DEFENSE AND RESTATEMENT, 95 (1999).
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economic hardship, and fail to repay debt in times of economic
prosperity.
There is a contradiction in Buchanan's assault on the Keynesian
paradigm, which is never properly acknowledged in his work. The
Public Choice perspective emphasizes the natural behavior of self-
interested people within a system of formal rules, but Buchanan's
attack on Keynes is primarily a complaint about a shift in ideas.
Buchanan acknowledges that government deficits were not a serious
problem for the first 150 years of U.S. history, because politicians and
voters respected the "norm of budget balance." This was "a widely
shared principle," "a moral constraint,"19 and "part of an accepted set of
attitudes about how government should, and must, carry on its fiscal
affairs. '20 Buchanan's lament about Keynesianism is that it caused a
"shift in ideas on public debt . .. [t]here was no longer any reason for
opposing deficit financing on basically moral grounds."21 Two questions
are raised. First, how can it be reasonable to say that the U.S.
government has a "quite natural tendency to generate budget deficits
almost continually" when it is also observed that for the bulk of its
history, the U.S. government did not do this? 22 Second, how can we
regard the behavior of individuals as naturally self-interested, when at
the same time we concede that such behavior has been shaped for long
periods by norms or "accepted attitudes"?
These are questions to which we shall return later on. For the
moment it is sufficient to observe that Buchanan himself did not explore
them. His own remedy for the problem of debt-financed expenditure in
the post-war period was a change to the formal rules of the game: an
amendment to the United States Constitution that would require the
federal government to balance its budget. The notion of a constitutional
limitation on government borrowing was not new in the United States
context: many U.S. state governments operated under such constraints.
Several adopted constitutional limitations on borrowing after a string of
state defaults on debt during the depression of the early 1840s. 23 No
similar constraint had ever been imposed on the U.S. federal
government. But Buchanan, reverting to his longstanding emphasis on
formalities, regarded it as essential. "The structural flaw in our fiscal
19. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE
POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 10 (Academic Press, Inc. ed., 1977).
20. Buchanan, Balanced Budget, supra note 16, at 119.
21. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra, note 19, at 16.
22. GEOFFREY BRENNAN AND JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 203 (digital paperback ed. 2006) (emphasis
added).
23. See, e.g., ALASDAIR ROBERTS, AMERICA'S FIRST GREAT DEPRESSION: ECONOMIC
CRISIS AND POLITICAL DISORDER AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837, at 49-83 (2012).
No SIMPLE Fix
politics . . . requires structural correction, that is, constitutional
constraint that will, effectively, change the basic rules for the fiscal
game."
24
By the late 1970s, there was a broad popular movement for the
addition of a balanced-budget rule to the United States Constitution,
triggered by public dissatisfaction with economic malaise and a
succession of federal budget deficits after 1969. In 1975, the Maryland
and Mississippi legislatures petitioned Congress to establish a
convention to draft a balanced-budget amendment. By 1979, twenty-
four other state legislatures had approved such a measure, and polls
showed that three-quarters of the U.S. public supported a constitutional
amendment. 25 There were strong commonalities in attitude between the
movement's leaders and scholars within the Public Choice school:
disdain for the "theories of Lord Keynes"; frustration over the collusion
of "selfish politicians and interest groups" in Washington; and, above
all, the conviction that there was "only one way" to restore fiscal order-
by constitutional reform.
26
The balanced-budget movement fell short of attaining the thirty-
four state petitions that were necessary for Congress to call a
constitutional convention. A second effort to amend the Constitution,
beginning this time with votes in the House of Representatives and
Senate, narrowly failed in 1982. Too many politicians and professional
economists expressed doubts about the wisdom of a constitutional
restriction. This included some conservative experts like Alan
Greenspan, who said that no "responsible economist" would support an
amendment. 27 By the early 1980s, Republican enthusiasm was
tempered because of the effect of Reagan administration policies, which
had produced larger deficits than in the 1970s. A balanced-budget
requirement would have necessitated a major retreat from Reagan's
commitments on tax relief and increased defense spending.
Still, the prolonged controversy brought attention and legitimacy to
the idea of legal constraints on fiscal policy. In 1985, Congress passed
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act, which established a
24. Buchanan, Balanced Budget, supra note 16, at 118.
25. See Adam Clymer, Carter Budget Gets Support in Survey: Public Backs Cuts in
Spending as Key Way to Combat Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1979, at All.
26. Iwan Morgan, Unconventional Politics: The Campaign for a Balanced-Budget
Amendment Constitutional Convention in the 1970s, 32 J. AM. STUD. 421, 421-424 (1998);
Editorial, Burditt Urges Amendment Requiring Balanced Federal Budget, REGISTER-STAR
(Rockford, Ill.), Oct. 13, 1974, at A3.
27. Tom Morganthau et a]., Balance-the-Budget Boom, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1979, at
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series of annual deficit targets, ending with a balanced budget in 1991.28
If the President and Congress failed to agree on a budget that came
within ten billion dollars of the deficit target, the law required
automatic spending reductions drawn equally from defense and select
domestic programs. 29 The theory was that the automatic reductions
would be so universally unappealing that the President and Congress
would be driven to meet the deficit target. Senator Phil Gramm, one of
the statute's sponsors, described it as a "binding constraint" that was
necessary to achieve long-term budget discipline;30 the Public Choice
school has been credited with providing the "philosophical
underpinning" for the law.31 President Reagan's Chief Budget Official,
James C. Miller III-former student of James Buchanan-also
described the law as "a kind of device . . . that a Public Choice scholar
would have advanced." 32 Buchanan himself lauded the statute as the
best alternative to a constitutional balanced-budget requirement.33
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was amended in 1987 and then
replaced by a new statute, the Budget Enforcement Act, in 1990. 34
President George H.W. Bush promised that under the new law
"budgetary discipline [would be] extended and strengthened."35 It
removed the binding deficit targets but established limits on some
categories of federal spending for the next five years, with the threat of
automatic cuts if the limits were not respected. It also established a new
principle, known as pay-as-you-go (PAYGO), under which new
legislative proposals for spending or tax reductions had to include
offsetting provisions so that there was overall change in the deficit. The
key elements of the Budget Enforcement Act were extended twice in the
1990s and ultimately expired in 2002.36
28. Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.
1037 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
29. Sung Deuk Hahm et al., The Influence of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on
Federal Budgetary Outcomes, 1986-1989, 11 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 207, 208 (1992).
30. 100 Cong. Rec. 21,733 (1987) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
31. Jane Seaberry, GMU Teacher Wins Nobel in Economics, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1986.
32. See generally id.; Jane Seaberry, ' Public Choice' Finds Allies in Top Places;
Economic Theory Flourishes at George Mason University, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1986.
33. See Jane Seaberry, Nobel Winner Sees Economics As Common Sense; Buchanan
Says His Public Choice Helps Explain Political Actions, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1986, at C1.
34. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573.
35. George Bush, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990 (Nov. 5, 1990) (transcript available at The American Presidency Project at the
University of California Santa Barbara), available at httpJ/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wspid=19000.
36. BILL HENIFF JR. ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-721, INTRODUCTION TO THE
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 5, 17-18 (2012).
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II. ORDOLIBERALISM AND EUROPE'S ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION
The European project on fiscal rules began in the period between
the two world wars, and has its clearest roots in the work of a group of
German lawyers and economists who became known as Ordoliberals.
Ordoliberals were intellectuals who had been repulsed by the chaos of
Germany's Weimar Republic during the 1920s. This chaos was economic
and political. A poorly regulated market economy had spawned cartels,
frauds, and violent clashes between capital and labor. The performance
of government had been as equally disappointing as the economic chaos:
undisciplined in monetary and fiscal policies, indulgent of powerful
interests, and capricious in its application of the law. Ordoliberals drew
two lessons from the Weimar years. The first lesson was a repudiation
of the laissez-faire idea that markets could organize themselves. Rather,
a strong state was essential to set rules that would prevent the market
from devolving into a "vulgar brawl."37 The second lesson was that the
state itself had to be protected against assaults by the "hungry hordes of
vested interests."38 Government needed to be "hedged in by .
limitations and safeguards" so that it would not be "devoured by
democracy."
39
We can see that Ordoliberals shared the Public Choice school's
suspicion about the trustworthiness of democratic processes. There was
another commonality: faith in the capability of law to prevent abuses,
either in the sphere of politics or in the marketplace. "At the core of the
ordoliberal program is the symbiotic character of the relationship
between legal and economic process," observes David Gerber. "Law
would provide basic principles of economic conduct, and government
officials would have no discretion to intervene in the economy except for
the purpose of enforcing those principles."4 0 Ordoliberal thinking was
shaped by the older German theory of the Rechsstaat, or the "law-based-
37. Werner Bonefeld, Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism, 17
NEW POL. ECON. 633, 637 (2012) (quoting Wilhelm Ri1pke, The Guiding Principles of the
Liberal Programme, in STANDARD TEXTS ON THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY 187, 188
(Horst Friedrich WiInsche ed., 1982)). For a brief overview of the origins of ordoliberalism,
see, e.g., Mathias Siems & Gerhard Schnyder, Ordoliberal Lessons for Economic Stability:
Different Kinds of Regulation, Not More Regulation, 27 GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L J. POL'Y,
ADMIN., & INSTS. 377 (2014) (clarifying the ordoliberal position on state intervention in
market economies).
38. WILHELM ROEPKE, THE SOCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME 181 (Transaction Publishers
1992) (1942).
39. WILHELM ROPKE, AGAINST THE TIDE 97 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1969).
40. David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism,
Competition Law and the "New"Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25, 46 (1994).
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state," which insists that state power must be "shaped and framed,
bound and limited by the law ... 41
Advocates of Ordoliberalism played a critical role in the
reconstruction of the West German state after the Second World War.
The main architect of post-war economic policy, Ludwig Erhard, insisted
that the state had a duty to resist all "special demands." Like the
referee in a football game, its duty was simply "to lay down the order
and the rules of the game."42 The new government eliminated price
controls, despite mass protests, and then pursued a strict anti-inflation
monetary policy despite complaints about its dampening effect on
growth.43 It also resisted demands for a Keynesian program of debt-
financed public expenditure. West Germany's 1949 Constitution
actually forbade borrowing except in extraordinary circumstances. 4 4
Rather than accumulating debt, the West German Government
produced surpluses for investment in public infrastructure by "savagely
overpricing and overtaxing the consumer."45 It also fought a decade-long
battle for a strict competition law, overcoming the opposition of German
industry.
46
German Ordoliberalism had a large influence on the design of
institutions for the emerging European common market. Perhaps this is
not surprising. Ordoliberals believed that markets did not emerge or
survive spontaneously, and that it was the duty of the statesperson to
draft an "economic constitution"-that is, a formal legal-institutional
framework-to govern the operation of a market economy. 47 This is
precisely what had to be done as European states negotiated the
41. Matthias Koetter, Rechsstaat und Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Germany, in
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN VARIOUS LEGAL ORDERS OF THE WORLD 1-2
(Gunnar Folke Schuppert ed., 2013).
42. LUDWIG ERHARD, PROSPERITY THROUGH COMPETITION 102 (Edith Temple Roberts
& John B. Wood trans., 1958).
43. See Wolfgang F. Stolper & Karl W. Roskamp, Planning a Free Economy: Germany
1945-1960, 135 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 374, 386 (1979).
44. See Prof. Dr. Markus Heintzen, Budgetary Balancing and Public Debt in German
Constitutional Law at the Conference R Pareggio Di Bilancio 3 (May 24, 2013). See also
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany [Constitution] May 8, 1949 art. 115
(stating that credits may only be taken "in the case of extraordinary need").
45. FREDERICK G. REUSS, FISCAL POLICY FOR GROWTH WITHOUT INFLATION: THE
GERMAN EXPERIMENT 35 (1963). See also Stolper & Roskamp, supra note 43, at 388
(discussing West Germany's use of force to stimulate savings and governmental
surpluses).
46. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 40, at 64-66 (explaining the history of the rise of the
ordoliberals).
47. VIKTOR J. VANBERG, THE FREIBURG SCHOOL: WALTER EUCKEN AND
ORDOLIBERALISM, 6 (Walter Eucken Inst., Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional
Economics No. 04/11, 2004).
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treaties that laid the groundwork for economic integration. This
groundwork quickly established the habit of referring to these treaties
as the European Community's "economic constitution." David Gerber
observes that the influence of Ordoliberal thinking was particularly
evident in European Community competition policy, which emphasized
clear rules against cartelization that were applied by experts who were
insulated from political pressures.
48
Ordoliberal principles were further advanced as the pace of
European economic integration quickened during the 1980s. A 1986
treaty, the Single European Act, set the goal of establishing a unified
European market by 1992. 4 9 It was widely recognized that this would
require currency reform so that trade was not hobbled by fluctuating
exchange rates. The 1989 Delors Report outlined a plan for the
European Community to adopt a single currency, but the report also
acknowledged that this change would require difficult decisions about
the institutional arrangements that would govern monetary and fiscal
policy within the community after a single currency had been adopted.
It was at this stage that the Ordoliberal approach again exercised its
influence. The Delors Report followed German practice in
recommending that a new European central bank should have strict
independence from political authorities with the single goal of
controlling inflation. The Report recommended "binding rules governing
the size and financing of national budget deficits" to avoid tensions
between monetary and fiscal policies.
50
The Delors recommendations were translated into law by the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The Treaty created an autonomous
European Central Bank with a mandate to maintain price stability. It
also prohibited national governments from incurring budget deficits
exceeding three percent of GDP, and total debt exceeding 60 percent of
GDP, once the new single currency (the euro) was in use after 1999.51 A
procedure was established for punishing governments that broke these
requirements. 52 The Maastricht Treaty requirements spurred an
48. Gerber, supra note 40, at 71-74.
49. Single European Act, art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 30.
50. Chairman of the Comm. for the Study of Econ. and Monetary Union, Rep. on
Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, 19 (Apr. 17, 1989) (Jacques
Delors).
51. See Treaty on European Union, Protocol on Excessive Deficit Procedure (now TFEU
protocol 12) (explains the provisions of article TEU art. 104 (now TFEU art. 126).
52. See Treaty on European Union art. 104 (as in effect 1993) (now TFEU art. 126)
(instructing the Commission to file a report if a Member State does not meet the debt ratio
requirements and requiring the Member State to take action in order to reduce the
deficit); Treaty on European Union art. 105 (as in effect 1993) (now TFEU art. 127)
(establishing that the European System of Central Banks shall supervise other financial
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interest in new fiscal rules at the national level, as countries prepared
to meet the deficit and debt requirements as a condition for entry into
the new Eurozone. 53 The European Commission counted only thirteen
fiscal rules operating in Member States in 1990, mainly affecting
subnational levels of government. 54 By 2000, over forty rules were in
force, with more than half affecting central government or all levels of
government combined.
55
III. BUDGET INSTITUTIONALISTS SET A GLOBAL NORM
By the early 1990s many countries around the world-including the
United States and European states, but also others-were struggling to
deal with rising government debt, and experimenting with reforms to
the process of budget making in the course of that struggle. These
reforms included experiments with fiscal rules. This reality, and the
active patronage of powerful institutions, spurred the rapid growth of a
new inquiry within economics that came to be known as budget
institutionalism.
Budget institutionalists actually worked within a sub-discipline of
economics known as political economy, which aspired to use the "main
tools of analysis" of economics to explain the evolution and operation of
political institutions.56 One of the main assumptions was that
institutions and policy outcomes were shaped by individuals who
behaved rationally in the pursuit of their own interests. There was a
commonality here with the older Public Choice scholarship. This was
especially clear as budget institutionalists explained why spending
appeared to have run out of control in many advanced democracies after
the early 1970s. In a 2007 paper, researchers for the European
Commission provided what was, by then, a standard account of the
problem:
institutions); Treaty on European Union art. 108 (now TFEU art. 130) (prohibiting the
governments of Member States from influencing the European Central Bank or of the
national central banks in the performance of their tasks); Treaty on European Union,
Protocol on Excessive Deficit Procedure (now TFEU protocol 12) (explaining the provisions
of article TEU art. 104 (now TFEU art. 126)).
53. Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals, et. al., Beyond the SGP: Features and Effects of EU
National-Level Fiscal Rules, in EUROPEAN ECONOMY ECONOMIC PAPERS 191, 195 (Eur.
Comm'n No. 275, 2007).
54. One country might have several rules.
55. Directorate-General for Econ. and Fin. Affairs for the European Comm'n, Public
Finances in the EMU 2006, 152, No. 3 (2006).
56. TORSTEN PERSSON & GuIDo TABELLINI, POLITICAL ECONOMICS: EXPLAINING
ECONOMIC POLICY 2 (Karl Gunnar Persson ed., 2000).
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Post-war economic history provides evidence that fiscal
authorities in industrialised countries may be prone to a
'deficit-bias', which shows up in large and persistent
deficits and growing public debts .... There is growing
agreement that the sources of the deficit bias is rooted in
... the system of incentives and rewards that shape the
behaviour of fiscal authorities. Governments, being
unsure to be re-elected, are inherently short-sighted and
do not fully take into account the longer term
implications of deficits. Groups in the society that
benefit from a particular type of government spending
do not fully internalise the costs of this expenditure,
since the financing is generally spread among a wide set
of contributors through taxation. This 'common pool
problem' is at the source of overspending and the
accumulation of deficits and debt over time.
57
Budget institutionalists also shared the Public Choice view that the
"deficit bias" could be corrected if the budgeting process was guided by
well-designed rules. In an influential 1992 paper funded by the
European Commission, Jiirgen von Hagen explained: "We start from the
presumption that budgeting procedures, i.e., the rules according to
which budgets are drafted by a government, amended and passed by
parliament, and implemented by the government, have important
consequences for the degree of fiscal stability attained."5 8 Von Hagen
then asked whether budgeting procedures that gave more power to
finance ministers, while limiting opportunities for parliamentary
amendments, were more likely to produce balanced budgets. He found
that such budgeting procedures did have this effect and concluded that
"institutional reform of the budgeting process is a promising avenue to
achieve a larger degree of fiscal discipline."59 This led to an extensive
body of research by several scholars that largely supported the view
57. Ayuso-i-Casals, et. al., supra note 53, at 192. For very similar explanations, see
Gabriel Filc & Carlos Scartascini, Budget Institutions and Fiscal Outcomes: Ten Years of
Inquiry on Fiscal Matters at the Research Department 4 (Sept. 17, 2004) (Conference
Paper Prepared for the Inter-American Bank's Research Department 10th Year
Anniversary Conference), available at
http://events.iadb.org/calendar/eventDetail.aspx?lang-En&id=2282 [hereinafter Budget
Institutions]; INT'L MONETARY FUND, PROMOTING FIscAL DISCIPLINE 3 (Manmohan S.
Kumar & Teresa Ter-Minassian eds., 2007); Xavier Debrun et al., Independent Fiscal
Agencies, 23 J. OF ECON. SURVEYS 44, 45 (2009).
58. Juirgen von Hagen, Budgeting Procedures & Fiscal Performance in the European
Community, COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ECON. PAPERS, no. 96, 1992, at 2.
59. Id. at 54.
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that centralized budgeting procedures led to better control over taxing
and spending.
60
Budget institutionalists had an even stronger interest in the effect
of fiscal rules on budget outcomes, and empirical work on this subject
grew along with the number of rules adopted. Researchers developed
more refined typologies of rules--discriminating, for example, by the
legal basis of the rule, the level of government affected, and the variable
(expenditure, deficit, debt) being controlled-and also more
sophisticated methods of statistical analysis.61 Much of this research
was supported by the European Commission and international
organizations, most notably the International Monetary Fund. By the
early 2000s, many of these institutions were converging on the view
that fiscal rules were an effective device for promoting budget discipline.
According to a 2009 IMF report, "[e]mpirical studies suggest that
national fiscal rules have generally been associated with improved fiscal
performance."62 A 2014 IMF working paper concurred: "A growing
literature has suggested that well-designed [fiscal rules] are generally
associated with greater fiscal discipline."63 While a 2013 report from the
European Commission added: "Well-designed rules-based frameworks
are known to significantly enhance budget discipline."
64
IV. THE MESSY REALITY OF FISCAL RULES
The allure of fiscal rules was greatest when they were viewed from a
distance: up close, experience with the operation of such rules was less
satisfying. This was certainly the case in the United States, which
began its experiments with statute-based fiscal rules in 1985, with the
passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Senator Phil Gramm had
promised that the law would impose a "binding constraint" on federal
fiscal policy.65 In practice, though, the years after 1985 provided a
60. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, et al., Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in
Latin America, 59 J. DEV. ECON. 253, 270 (1999); Budget Institutions, supra note 57, at 4-
5; Gabriel Filc & Carlos Scartascini, Budgetary Institutions, in THE STATE OF STATE
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, 157, 179 (Eduardo Lora ed., 2007).
61. See generally KOPITS & SYMANSKY, supra note 2, for an important early work on
this subject. For an illustration of how work had advanced in the following fifteen years,
see generally Schaechter et al., supra note 7.
62. Int'l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep't Paper, Fiscal Rules: Anchoring
Expectations for Sustainable Public Finance 15 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at
https://www.imf.org/externalnp/sec/pn/2009/pnO9139.htm.
63. Jean-Louis Combes et al., Inflation Targeting and Fiscal Rules: Do Interactions
and Sequencing Matter? 3 (Int'l. Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 14/89, 2014).
64. Eur. Comm'n., Report on Public Finaces in the EMU 2013, 45, 4/2013 (2013).
65. Statement of Sen. Gramm, supra note 30.
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demonstration of how difficult it was to impose a binding constraint
through statutes rather than constitutional provisions. Indeed, the 1985
law was immediately compromised because of a successful
constitutional challenge to the mechanism that had been established to
execute the "automatic" spending cuts that were supposed to provide an
incentive for policymakers to reach a deal on deficit reduction.
6 6
Congress amended the law to create an alternative mechanism in 1987.
This proved to be the least of the problems with the 1985 law.
Critics soon complained that legislators were attempting to comply with
its deficit targets through "reliance on overly optimistic economic and
technical assumptions and transparent budget gimmickry."67 Even so,
Congress could not actually meet its targets. In 1987, it amended the
law to loosen the annual deficit reduction requirements, and extend the
deadline for balancing the federal budget by two years, to 1993. The
challenge of meeting the deficit targets continued, and was aggravated
after the onset of a recession in the summer of 1990. In November 1990,
Congress eliminated the binding deficit targets entirely. The new
Budget Enforcement Act established caps on certain categories of
expenditure instead of attempting to eliminate deficits entirely. But it
also stated that "emergency appropriations" should not be counted
against the spending caps, and it allowed those caps to be suspended
entirely in times of war or low economic growth.
68
In fact, the federal deficit did shrink and was eliminated entirely in
1998. Still, complaints about disrespect for the principles of the Budget
Enforcement Act persisted. The spending caps were repeatedly modified
in the 1990s, and there was a sharp increase in emergency
appropriations, much of which "had little to do with actual
emergencies." 69 Irene Rubin has argued that respect for the law declined
quickly when budget balance was regained.70 The Budget Enforcement
Act expired in 2002, and the federal government returned to a pattern
of chronic deficits, aggravated by new expenditures on homeland
66. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding that the "automatic" spending
cuts violated the Constitution because it gave Congress the power to execute the law).
67. Robert D. Reischauer, Taxes and Spending Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 43
NAT'L. TAx. J. 223, 223 (1990).
68. MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, STATUTORY BUDGET CONTROLS IN EFFECT BETWEEN 1985
AND 2002 9 (Cong. Research Serv. Rep. No. R41901, 2011), httpJ/fas.orgsgp/crstmiscfR4190l.pdf.
69. Alan J. Auerbach, Federal Budget Rules: The U.S. Experience 5 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14288, 2008).
70. See Irene Rubin, The Great Unraveling: Federal Budgeting, 1998-2006, 67 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 608, 609 (2007). See also Barry Anderson & Joseph J. Minarik, Design
Choices for Fiscal Policy Rules, OCED J. ON BUDGETING, Sept. 28, 2006, at 159 (discussing
budget process rules in the context of the current pattern of rising fiscal deficits).
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security and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after the terror attacks of
September 11, 2001.
Experience with the debt and deficit rules established by the 1992
Maastricht Treaty was similarly unsatisfying. The 1989 Delors Report
said that these requirements should operate as "binding constraints" on
national fiscal policies, but advocates of fiscal discipline soon became
concerned that national governments were not taking the treaty's
requirements seriously. In 1995, the German Finance Minister, Theo
Waigel, proposed that the European Union should adopt additional
rules to enforce the Maastricht criteria. It was essential, Waigel argued,
that national deficits should not exceed the Maastricht limit of 3 percent
of GDP, "even in economically unfavorable periods."71 A 1997
agreement, the Stability and Growth Pact, followed Waigel's proposals
closely. It established a mechanism for monitoring national fiscal
policies and threatened substantial fines if governments violated the
Maastricht rules.
The 1997 Pact was initially lauded as "one of the most remarkable
pieces of policy coordination in world history."72 Its severe enforcement
provisions seemed to work. Compliance with the Maastricht Treaty
requirements was generally good in the period immediately before the
adoption of the euro in 1999. Later, though, critics would ask whether
this behavior had actually been motivated by the strong desire of
national governments to assure their inclusion within the Eurozone
when the new currency was launched, rather than by fear of
punishment under the Pact.7 3 One country, Greece, also admitted in
2004 that it had manipulated its budget data so that it qualified for
admission to the Eurozone in 2001.
The European economy weakened in 2001, as did the United States',
and several major economies-including France and Germany-
repeatedly exceeded the Maastricht deficit limits. This was the first
major test of the Stability and Growth Pact, and it was a debacle. The
European Commission, following procedures laid out in the Pact,
recommended enforcement actions against Germany and France. But
the European Council, representing the national governments, refused
to adopt the Commission's recommendations, and the European Court of
71. Proposal by Theo Waigel for a Stability Pact for Europe (November 1995), CVCE.EU
3 (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2OO5/7/4/50fc7cc3-
Oa4d-4762-9ee5-e312d32d41fl/publishable en.pdf.
72. Marco Buti & Gabriele Giudice, Maastricht's Fiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment,
40 J COMMON MKT. STUD. 823, 830 (2002) (quoting Michael J. Artis, The Stability and
Growth Pact: Fiscal Policy in the EMU, in INSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ASPECTS
OF THE EMU 101, 155 (Fritz Breuss et al. eds., 2002)).
73. See id. at 827.
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Justice refused to overturn the Council's decision.74 The drafters of the
Pact intended that their procedures should be "binding," one observer
wrote in early 2005, "and yet they have been set aside when they
clashed with economic and political reality."75 Two months later,
European leaders agreed to modify the enforcement procedures so that
they had more discretion to incur larger deficits during economic
downturns or other exceptional circumstances.
European finance ministers attempted to renew their commitment
to fiscal discipline in November 2007, affirming that compliance with
the Stability Pact requirements was "a key priority." 76 But events
intervened once again. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 caused
government expenditures (including financial sector bailouts) to
skyrocket, while revenues plummeted. By 2011, almost all of the
Eurozone countries had fallen out of compliance with the Maastricht
Treaty's deficit or debt restrictions. The response was to propose even
more strengthening of oversight and enforcement mechanisms, first by
issuing a set of new regulations adopted in 2011, then by passing a new
treaty in 2012, and again by adopting further regulations in 2013.
7 7 All
of these measures, however, make a show of toughening the constraints
on national governments. For example, the 2012 treaty, known as the
Fiscal Compact, requires that governments adopt national balanced-
budget legislation, which must require "automatic" corrections when
governments deviate from their budgetary targets. But national
governments have still managed to preserve discretion. Constitutional
amendments to mandate a balanced budget are not required, and the
Compact recognizes the "prerogatives of national Parliaments" to decide
whether the correction mechanisms should be adjusted in exceptional
circumstances.
7 8
As one can see, actual experience with fiscal rules in the United
States and Eurozone countries has proven to be complicated. Such rules
have tended to be pliable, rather than rigid, constraints on fiscal policy.
This has been true in several other nations as well.79 This observation
might seem to be at odds with the cheerful endorsements of fiscal rules
that have been made by organizations, like the IMF, drawing on
empirical research done by budget institutionalists. But these
74. See Case C-27104, Comm'n v. Council, 2004 E.C.R. 1-6679.
75. Charles Wyplosz, Fiscal Policy: Institutions Versus Rules, 191 NAT'L INST. ECON.
REV. 64, 70 (2005).
76. Press Release, Council of European Union, 2822nd Council Meeting on Economic
and Financial Affairs, at 10 (Oct. 9, 2007).
77. The measures are described in Int'l Monetary Fund, Budget Institutions in G-20
Countries: An Update, 2014 IMF POL. PAPERS 12.
78. TSCG, supra note 3, at art. 3.2.
79. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 59-61.
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endorsements must be treated cautiously. On a closer reading, the
research itself is more nuanced.
Budget institutionalists have grappled with three major problems in
their research. The first problem has to do with cause and effect. Do
fiscal rules cause governments to pursue more stringent fiscal policies,
or do governments that are already inclined toward austerity adopt
fiscal rules as a sign of their policy commitments? Attempts to sort out
this problem of causality through statistical analysis have had mixed
results.80 The 2009 IMF report that endorsed the effectiveness of fiscal
rules also conceded that "stronger political commitment to fiscal
discipline... could lead to both an improvement in performance and the
adoption of rules." The report conceded that "there [was] no fully
satisfactory methodology to deal with this issue" and that existing
research that appeared to show a causal connection between fiscal rules
and budget discipline "should be interpreted with some caution."81
There are, in fact, many cases in which governments adopted fiscal
rules after a major crisis had driven political leaders to pursue an
austerity program. Sweden, for example, undertook a program of
retrenchment following a financial crisis in the early 1990s, but did not
adopt a fiscal rule until 1997. The 2009 IMF report concedes that
governments have often used fiscal rules "to lock-in earlier consolidation
efforts rather than at the beginning of the fiscal adjustment."8 2 A
similar observation was made in an IMF study of four countries that
adopted "fiscal responsibility laws," which sometimes contain numerical
budgeting targets, with apparent success. The study observed that fiscal
performance in those countries had "started to improve several years
before the implementation of the law, suggesting that a fair amount of
consensus for the need for fiscal prudence was already at play."
8 3
A second major problem with empirical studies on the effect of fiscal
rules has to do with the fact that not all rules are alike. In particular,
there is variation in the legal basis for a rule. Some rules are
entrenched in constitutions whereas others are expressed only in
governmental policy statements. Researchers, who have developed
methods for measuring the extent to which a fiscal rule is embedded in
80. See, e.g., James M. Poterba & Kim Rueben, State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S.
Municipal Bond Market, in FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE 181 (James
M. Poterba et al. eds., 1999); Xavier Debrun et al., Tied to the Mast? National Fiscal Rules
in the European Union, 23 ECON. POL'Y 298 (2008).
81. INT'L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL RULES-ANCHORING EXPECTATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC FINANCES 19, 20 (2009).
82. Id. at 3.
83. Ana Corbacho & Gerd Schwartz, Fiscal Responsibility Laws, in PROMOTING FISCAL
DISCIPLINE 58, 71 (Manmohan S. Kumar & Teresa Ter-Minassian eds., 2007).
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"hard law," have recognized this variation. 84 Their research has shown
that the positive effect of fiscal rules occurs mainly when the rules are
entrenched in hard law. This was the main lesson drawn from early
studies of the balanced-budget requirements of U.S. state governments,
which are typically contained in state constitutions.8 5 As Robert Inman
explained in 1996, an effective balanced-budget rule "must be
constitutionally, not statutorily, grounded; [and] there must be open
enforcement by a politically independent agent capable of imposing
significant penalties for deficit violations . *..."86 Later research,
drawing on the experience of other countries, reached a similar
conclusion. Thus, the 2006 European Commission report that confirmed
"a link between numerical rules [that is, fiscal rules that specified a
numerical target] and budgetary outcomes" also cautioned that "the
characteristics of fiscal rules matter .... Strong rules, enshrined in law
or constitution and foreseeing automatic enforcement mechanisms,
seem to have a larger influence."
8 7
The difficulty, as we have seen, is that nations are unlikely to bind
themselves with "strong rules" or "hard law" with regard to taxing and
spending by national rather than sub-national governments. In 2012,
the International Monetary Fund determined that seventy-six countries
had adopted 166 fiscal rules to control the fiscal policy of their national
governments.8 8 Only five of these 166 rules were entrenched in national
constitutions. Of the remaining rules, roughly one-third were based in
statutes, while half were based in international treaties.8 9 In other
words, national fiscal rules tend to be expressed in softer forms of law.90
We can understand why this is so: governments want to preserve
their sovereignty over fiscal policy. But this means that general
84. See Jakob de Haan, Helge Berger & David-Jan Jansen, Why Has the Stability and
Growth Pact Failed? 7 INT'L FiN. 235, 237-38 (2004) (discussing the distinction between
rules expressed in "hard" and "soft" law).
85. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 3 (2010).
86. Robert P. Inman, Do Balanced Budget Rules Work? U.S. Experience and Possible
Lessons for the EMU 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5838, 1996).
87. Directorate-General for Econ. and Fin. Affairs for the European Comm'n, supra
note 55, at 15.
88. One government could be bound by more than one rule: for example, there might be
separate rules on deficits and debts, and overlapping rules expressed in different forms of
law.
89. See Schaechter et al., supra note 7, at 17. The few remaining fiscal rules were
expressed in political statements or agreements. Treaty obligations are mainly those
agreed to by countries in the Eurozone.
90. For a discussion of European Union requirements as a form of soft law, see Ludger
Schuknecht, EU Fiscal Rules: Issues and Lessons from Political Economy 14-16 (Eur.
Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 421, 2004).
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statements about the effectiveness of fiscal rules must be treated
cautiously. It may well be the case that "well-designed" rules are
effective in shaping fiscal outcomes. But this may not be a useful
finding, at least with regard to the control of national-level fiscal
policies, if practice shows that governments are reluctant to adopt well-
designed rules. The real question, then, is-are fiscal rules of the type
that national governments are likely to adopt effective in shaping fiscal
policy? The answer to this question is much more equivocal. Statutory
rules can be amended or abandoned when they become inconvenient,
and treaty obligations may be flouted, as experience in the European
Union has shown.
A final difficulty that has been highlighted by research has to do
with problems of drafting and compliance. Even if fiscal rules are
embedded in "hard law," their effectiveness may be compromised if they
are drafted so that governments preserve discretion over fiscal policy or
if they can be easily evaded. And this is often the case. A 2012 survey
found that one-fifth of countries excluded some types of revenue or
expenditure from the targets contained in their fiscal rules, and that
many rules also contained vaguely worded "escape clauses."91 For
example, India's 2003 fiscal responsibility law allows the central
government to ignore targets "on grounds of national security or
national calamity or such other exceptional grounds as the Central
Government may specify."92 The practice of evading fiscal rules by
"creative financing devices" is also well established.9 3 "Rules can be
circumvented in many ways," a 2010 IMF working paper concedes,
"such as by creative accounting, including by generating overly
optimistic forecasts of economic variables, and by strategically
determining what categories of expenditure are kept off budget."94 Of
course, judicial review might serve as a check against evasion, were it
not for the general reluctance of courts to rule on politically sensitive
questions. Some budget institutionalists have argued that another
remedy might be to establish specialized and autonomous fiscal
agencies to serve as "impartial enforcers" of fiscal rules. 95 This is part of
a general shift in the emphasis away from the power of fiscal rules by
91. See generally Schaechter et al. supra note 7 (discussing the reasons why
governments prefer escape clauses and how they apply escape clauses).
92. The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, No. 39 of 2003, INDIA CODE
§ 4(2)(b) (2003).
93. RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE BALANCED
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, 50 (1996).
94. Era Dabla-Norris et al., Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income
Countries 6, 7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/10/80, 2010).
95. Debrun et al., supra note 57 at 61; see also Schaechter et al., supra note 7 at 24
(discussing countries implementing independent fiscal agencies to enforce fiscal rules).
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themselves. The new prescription is for a "rules-based framework"-a
more expansive concept that may also include more centralized
budgeting processes as well as independent overseers of fiscal policy.
V. THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT: A REAPPRAISAL
For some advocates of fiscal discipline experience with the actual
operation of fiscal rules was very disappointing. These advocates shared
the view that there was something wrong with democratic processes:
these processes had a dangerous tendency toward ever-increasing
expenditures and debt. Fiscal rules were supposed to counteract this
tendency, but now it appeared that they did not work as efficiently as it
had been hoped. Governments had refused to adopt strong rules or
evaded those they already adopted. This implied that the expansionary
tendencies of democratic governments would continue unabated. The
"crisis of democracy," first observed in the early 1970s, seemed to persist
forty years later.
96
This was a story of failure and alarm, but it had a flaw. It
underestimated the substantive progress that many countries had made
on fiscal policy during the three decades in which they had
experimented with fiscal rules. Admittedly, progress was uneven over
time and between countries, but, on the whole, countries managed to
bring their debt under control (See Figure 1). It was an exaggeration to
say that democracies learned nothing during their three decades of
experimentation with fiscal rules. Somehow they had responded to the
challenge of fiscal stress.
There is, in fact, an alternative way of thinking about the
experience of the last three decades, which yields a more charitable view
about the performance of the advanced democracies, and also yields a
more modest view about what law can contribute to the process of social
change. This alternative view requires a basic shift in the approach that
is taken to the problem of fiscal indiscipline. A common feature of much
of the "fiscal rules" literature-whether of the Public Choice,
Ordoliberal, or budget institutionalist varieties-is the tendency to
regard expenditure and debt growth as an ineluctable and timeless
feature of democratic systems. Granted, this literature is always
motivated by concerns about indiscipline during a specific moment in
history. But the problem of indiscipline is never specified as one that is
96. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE FOURTH REVOLUTION: THE
GLOBAL RACE TO REINVENT THE STATE 18-21 (2014) (discussing tax, spending, and
efficiency issues plaguing modern democracies); NIALL FERGUSON, THE GREAT
DEGENERATION: How INSTITUTIONS DECAY AND ECONOMIES DIE 39-40 (Penguin Press ed.
2013) (2012) (discussing the debt burdens accumulated by Western democracies).
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peculiar to that historical moment. Rather, the problem is abstracted,
and the diagnosis is made timeless: bad outcomes result from strategic
behavior of self-interested actors operating within a certain set of rules.
Sometimes, there is a twinge of recognition that there is something
wrong with this approach. For example, as we saw earlier, James
Buchanan admitted that U.S. democracy was not prone to indiscipline
before the Second World War. But this recognition does not deter the
practice of producing highly abstracted diagnoses of the causes of
indiscipline.
It is not necessary to dismiss the abstracted explanation of fiscal
indiscipline entirely, but a more powerful explanation would probably
include factors that are peculiar to a specific place and time. To put it
another way, it would recognize that pressure toward indiscipline is also
context-contingent, and thus not necessarily an inevitable feature of the
democratic process. In the United States, for example, we should
account for several considerations that intensified the demand for
expenditure in the post-war period.
One of the most important of these considerations is the
predisposition of the generation that came to maturity in the 1960s and
early 1970s-the baby boomers. They differed from preceding
generations in several ways. First, they had grown up during a period of
rapid economic expansion. Real GDP doubled between 1955 and 1974:
the United States had not experienced that sort of sustained growth
since before the First World War. Faith in the federal government was
also extraordinarily strong-indeed, notably stronger than that of older
Americans in that period. Throughout the 1960s, according to the
American National Election Studies, more than two-thirds of baby
boomers believed that they could trust the federal government to do the
right thing most or all of the time.97 Again, this was an understandable
response to recent history because the federal government had grappled
with immense problems-the Depression, the Second World War, the
Cold War-with apparent success.
Under such circumstances, it is probably not surprising that a host
of new demands were made on federal authorities. And it is important
to emphasize that these demands were not thrust on unwilling leaders.
In the United States, and other advanced democracies, the
establishment shared the public's faith in governmental capabilities and
97. See Trust the Federal Government 1958-2008, AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUD. tbl.
5.A.1.2 (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/2ndtable/t5a1__2.htm
[hereinafter Trust] (showing that from 1966 to 1968, of those surveyed at minimum 69% of
Americans born between 1927 and 1958 said they trusted the federal government all or
most of the time).
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prospects for continued growth. The reality of the 1960s, the journalist
Theodore White wrote, was
liberal dominance, in Congress, in academia, in the
press, on television, in the great foundations and 'think
tanks.' Under Republican presidents, as under
Democratic presidents, the liberal idea prevailed-that
the duty of government was to conceive programs and
fund them so that whatever was accepted as right and
just, at home or abroad, would come to pass.
98
It was this faith that had motivated the launch of Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society program in 1964. It included a large amount of confidence
in the capability of federal authorities to manage the overall economy
through the manipulation of taxing and spending, as Keynes had
suggested. 99 Even President Richard Nixon, a Republican, conceded that
he was "a Keynesian in economics." 100
If the U.S. economy had sustained the same rate of GDP growth
after 1974, there would be no anxiety about the level of federal debt
today. 101 However, the structure of the American economy changed
profoundly in the following decades. Real GDP growth slumped to three
percent in the period between 1975 and 2008. The pattern of
international trade and finance also shifted. The United States began to
import more goods and services than it exported, and became dependent
on foreign investment to pay for that gap in trade. Slower growth meant
that it was harder for the federal government to meet new demands for
expenditure, while shifts in the patterns of finance meant that U.S.
policymakers had to be more sensitive to the moods of overseas
investors. The United States had not been in such a position since
before the Civil War.
102
98. THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT 1956-1980, at 24 (1982).
99. See John Kenneth Galbraith, The Public Sector is Still Starved, CHALLENGE, Jan.-
Feb. 1967, at 18, 21 (discussing Keynesian economics and the need for increased federal
spending in the U.S. public sector).
100. Leonard Silk, Nixon's Program-'I Am Now a Keynesian', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
1971, at El.
101. The GDP growth rate dropped by about one percent after 1974. This meant that
GDP was about forty percent lower by 2008. If GDP growth had not declined, the
proportion of publicly held federal debt to GDP in 2008 would have been roughly what it
was in 1974.
102. See ROBERTS, supra note 23, at 5-11 (comparing the modern U.S. economy to the
U.S. economy following the economic crises of 1836-1848, particularly how the economy in
both cases depended on foreign countries).
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The politics of the post-1974 era was preoccupied with the
adjustment of public expectations to these new economic realities. This
adjustment was a difficult process for at least three reasons. The first is
that no one knew, at that time, whether the economy was undergoing a
fundamental change, or merely suffering a temporary perturbation that
could be managed using conventional techniques of economic control.
Initially, and understandably, there was a strong inclination to believe
that the problem was transient and manageable. In the United States,
as in many other countries, much of the 1970s were spent with
interventions that seemed likely to work based on previous experience.
The results were miserable: economic stagnation and high inflation. In
hindsight it might have been better to pursue different policies
(including more rigorous expenditure and inflation control) earlier.
Again, though, it took time for people to appreciate the scale of their
economic troubles.
Another factor also complicated the process of adjustment. This
factor was the need for a massive project of ideational change, both
within the establishment and the public at large. Within the federal
government, a generation of politicians and bureaucrats had refined a
set of ideas about the role of government that predisposed them toward
activism, particularly in the sphere of economic management. Some of
these politicians and bureaucrats would gradually develop a new way of
thinking about the federal role, while others would be removed or
retired. In either case, the process of change was necessarily slow.
Meanwhile a similar but much larger exercise had to occur within the
voting population. This, too, required either the acquisition of new ways
of thinking, or the slow displacement of one generation of voters by
another. Finally, the process of change was complicated by the fact that
policy choices made in the 1960s and 1970s were embedded in actual
programs, and these programs were hard to change. The problem was
not simply resistance from bureaucrats within federal programs.
Millions of Americans were beneficiaries of these new initiatives, while
millions more had made substantial educational and business
investments that were predicated on the assumption that they would
continue.
It was the task of the democratic process to make the adjustments
necessary to accommodate new economic realities, and to do this in such
a way that a sufficiently large proportion of the U.S. electorate accepted
the adjustments. By the turn of the millennium, these adjustments had
been largely accomplished. There was, for example, a significant shift in
institutional arrangements within the federal government. One of the
most noticeable changes was the rise of the Federal Reserve, whose role
in preserving price stability was now regarded as critical by financial
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markets. In 1967, John Kenneth Galbraith said that the Federal
Reserve ought to be regarded as "a minor instrumentality of the state..
• standing in importance between the Bureau of Printing and Engraving
and the Interstate Commerce Commission."'10 3 Almost forty years later,
the chairman of the Federal Reserve enjoyed "rock star status."1
0 4
Nevertheless, the story was not solely, or even primarily, about
institutional change. There were important changes in elite and public
opinion as well. Bill Clinton confirmed the transformation of
establishment attitudes in 1996, when he declared that the "era of big
government is over."'1 5 Meanwhile the public at large also became more
skeptical about federal government programs. Of course, this included a
large number of disillusioned baby boomers, but by 2008 it also included
a larger number of adult Americans who had never held a favorable
view of the federal government. 0 6 Accompanying these shifts in
institutional arrangements and ideas was a shift in federal policy
outcomes, including a much better record of inflation control, and a
largely successful effort to contain the growth of federal expenditure
(See Figure Two).
This process of adjustment had few features that would make it
appealing to technocrats or financiers. It was slow, spanning decades. It
was also prone to reversals. For example, budget discipline ebbed when
economic growth rebounded in the late 1990s, and during the national
security panic that followed the 9/11 attacks. Very often, progress could
not be made until the country had reached the brink of crisis.10 7 The
United States was not alone in this regard. Many other advanced
democracies did not take the process of retrenchment seriously until
they confronted a currency crisis (as New Zealand did in 1984, and
103. Galbraith, supra note 99, at 21.
104. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 50
(2009).
105. William J. Clinton, President, U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on
the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996) (transcript available at
http:www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091). In Britain, the former Labor Party cabinet
minister Peter Mandelson echoed Nixon's famous comment about Keynes: "We are all
Thatcherite now." David Charter, Mandelson Tells Labour: We're All Thatcherites, TIMES
(London), June 10, 2002 (Home News).
106. The American National Election Studies have conducted biennial surveys of
American voters since 1958. One question asks whether voters "trust the government in
Washington to do the right thing." Trust, supra note 97. Only once (in 2002) did a slim
majority of the cohort born in 1959-1974 say that they trusted the federal government
most or all of the time. Id. The cohort born in 1975-1990 is similarly skeptical. Id.
107. See generally DAVID RUNCIMAN, THE CONFIDENCE TRAP: A HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN CRISIS FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE PRESENT (2013) (arguing that democracies grow
complacent and only address major issues when faced with crises).
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Sweden did in 1992) or the risk of an imminent currency crisis (as
Canada did in 1993).
The United States, as the dominant economic power, was not
vulnerable to exactly this sort of shock. Nevertheless, it did suffer
through repeated episodes in which policymakers seemed willing to go
to the brink of financial disruption before agreeing on new fiscal
policies. In 1985, the United States risked default when the Republican
president and the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives could
not agree on an adjustment to the statutory limit on federal borrowing:
this episode unsettled financial markets but eventually produced the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law. There was another standoff between a
Republican president and a Democratic Congress in 1990, this time
triggered by the risk of deep cuts required by the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings law. This led to a brief government shutdown, but also a new
agreement on fiscal policy, contained in the Budget Enforcement Act.
There was a third budget crisis in late 1995, this time between a
Democratic president and a Republican Congress, which again involved
a risk of default because of Congress' refusal to raise the debt limit, as
well as a three week government shutdown. This crisis was followed by
repeated small conflicts over the debt ceiling throughout the early
2000s, and two larger debt-ceiling crises in 2011 and 2013, which led to
yet another shutdown but also new legislation to control longer-term
spending.108
What role had fiscal rules played in this decades-long process of
adjustment? Clearly they played some sort of role. The Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act and the Budget Enforcement Act were compacts,
or treaties: they gave expression to the settlement that was reached at a
particular moment of time between rival factions on questions of taxing
and spending. These laws also gave reassurance to voters and investors
about the intentions of federal policymakers, affirming and bolstering
the shift in public attitudes toward a more conservative fiscal policy.
Finally, these laws made it somewhat harder-although certainly not
impossible-for policymakers to shift away from a policy of
retrenchment. It became more difficult to increase spending, partly
108. See D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE
DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 3-14 (2010) (discussing the debt limit issues
from 2002 to 2009); MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41633, REACHING
THE DEBT LIMIT: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 6-
8 (2013) (discussing the debt limit issues of 2011 and 2013, and the Budget Control Act of
2011). See generally CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS (2013) (discussing the
effects a shutdown has on various agencies of the federal government).
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because the law created new procedural hurdles, and because it obliged
politicians to renege on high-profile commitments to budget discipline.
Would it be fair to go further and say that these fiscal rules had
caused retrenchment at the federal level? This was the hypothesis
advanced by budget institutionalists. But it is difficult to see how this
could be the case. Fiscal rules embedded in statutes could not restrain
politicians and voters who were not already agreed on the idea of
discipline. When the power of rival factions in Washington shifted, or
popular sentiment changed, then the law that had expressed the
prevailing political settlement gave way. It follows from this that the
more important determinant of fiscal policy was probably elite and
public opinion about the role of the federal government and its fiscal
policy and the relative power of rival camps in Washington. The shift
toward discipline happened after a long war of ideas, evolving in
response to experience over time, and because of shifts in power from
one generation to the next.
VI. DEMOCRATIC FAILURE OR DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS?
As we have seen, many advocates of fiscal rules overestimated their
importance as constraints on national policymaking. These advocates
tended to have a simplistic view of how politics worked and an excessive
faith in the capability of institutional reforms to cause changes in the
content of fiscal policy.
Nevertheless, advocates of fiscal rules were not alone in these
misapprehensions. Some critics of fiscal rules shared these views about
the nature of politics and the power of law. They differed from advocates
of fiscal rules mainly in their appraisal of the anticipated effects of those
rules. Advocates of fiscal rules liked the expected outcome, which was
fiscal discipline. Critics disliked the constraint that was imposed on
democratically elected politicians and voters. This was an argument
that extended to other institutional reforms as well, such as laws to
reinforce the autonomy of central banks, regulatory agencies, or bodies
that were involved in the facilitation of trade and investment. On one
side were people who argued that these reforms were essential to the
smooth operation of a globalized market economy. On the other side
were people who argued that these were pernicious constraints on the
democratic process. 10 9 However, advocates and critics alike shared the
assumption that institutional innovations had some effect-that is, they
109. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 11; Thomas Meaney & Yascha Mounk, What Was
Democracy?, THE NATION, June 2, 2014, at 24.
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assumed that these institutional innovations actually constrained the
normal operation of democratic politics.
Were the critics right? One objection was that fiscal rules were
rarely forced on national governments. Democratically elected
politicians choose to adopt them, and as a result, the reforms could be
said to have democratic legitimacy. 110 This, however, is probably not the
right way to frame the objection. We can easily imagine a situation
where a democratically elected legislature adopts a law that effectively
destroys the democratic system. An extreme example is the Enabling
Act passed by the Reichstag in 1933, which gave total power to the
chancellor, Adolf Hitler. The fact that the Reichstag had a claim to
democratic legitimacy hardly made the new regime defensible.'1 1 The
critical question is probably whether democratically elected politicians
retain the power to reverse their reforms at some later point. The
legitimacy of reforms is demonstrated by the virtue of the fact that
voters and politicians have preserved the power to undo them, and
choose not to exercise that power.
As a matter of experience regarding fiscal rules, we can see that
national governments have been careful to preserve their capability to
undo reforms. Particularly at the national level, politicians largely avoid
rules that are expressed in forms (e.g., constitutional amendments) that
make it harder to reverse course later. Governments also seek to
preserve discretion through vague wording, and they often reverse
themselves, either explicitly or implicitly. They amend or abandon
legislation and ignore or evade legal requirements. "Binding
constraints" and "automatic mechanisms" rarely prove to be binding or
automatic in practice. Ultimately, sovereignty over fiscal policy is
preserved. In this respect, the threat to democratic principles that is
posed by fiscal rules would seem to be overstated.
We might go a step further. Not only was the autonomy of
democratic institutions not seriously undermined by fiscal rules during
the neoliberal era, but also, more positively, democratic systems
demonstrated their capability to respond to the problems of rising
expenditure and debt. In 1980, one of President Carter's chief economic
advisers, Alfred Kahn, had lamented the "constant forces to increase
expenditures... to expand government programs," and wondered: "Can
110. See Richard Allen, The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture
of Government, 24 GOVERNANCE 739, 740 (2011) (book review) for an example of this
argument.
111. In fact, there is room to doubt that this law was properly adopted: many legislators
were unable to vote or were threatened with violence.
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a democracy discipline itself'?" 112 The answer might now appear to be:
'Yes, it can." It may not do this as quickly or systematically as an
authoritarian regime, and often it might need to be jolted by crisis. On
the other hand, the result has a degree of legitimacy that cannot usually
be produced by the action of an authoritarian regime. Some people may
not like the results of retrenchment within a democracy, but most
people accept that the decision to pursue that policy was properly
made.
113
There are three possible objections to this argument. The first
objection is that retrenchment runs the risk of responding to an
excessively abstract critique of the democratic process with an equally
abstract defense. It may well be that the United States answered
Kahn's question affirmatively over the last three decades: experience in
other countries may differ. This is fair comment. It would be better to
say that in a particular country, in a particular period, fiscal problems
were eventually addressed-and so, in that country, the critique of
democracy was rebutted.
A second objection is that we have overestimated the degree of
legitimacy that attaches to the outcomes that have been generated by
U.S. federal politics over the last three decades. Here, we are obliged to
acknowledge that most U.S. citizens now express a very low level of
trust in federal government, as well as a strong sense that the country
is heading in the wrong direction overall. 114 However, this evidence
must be interpreted carefully. Trust may be low relative to levels of the
1950s and 1960s, but we have no way of knowing whether the
immediate postwar period was itself an anomaly. To some degree, the
decline in trust may be precisely the outcome that is desired: that is, it
may reflect a weakened propensity to make demands on the federal
government. 11 5 What might be more important are behavioral measures
of legitimacy, such as the extent of protest, disrespect for law, and
withdrawal from forms of political participation. However, from this
point of view there is still no strong evidence of an approaching crisis of
112. WHITE, supra note 98, at 149 (quoting Alfred Kahn, one of President Carter's chief
economic advisers).
113. On the definition and measurement of state legitimacy, see BRUCE GILLEY, THE
RIGHT TO RULE: How STATES WIN AND LOSE LEGITIMACY 3-16 (2009).
114. See Alasdair Roberts, The Government We Deserve, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (May 21,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/2005/2021/the.government-wedeserve
(arguing an era of neoliberal policies reduced the confidence U.S. citizens have in the
federal government and the direction of the country).
115. It is noteworthy that there has been no similar shift in trust in state and local
government over the last four decades.
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legitimacy. 116 As to concern about the direction in which the country is
heading, this can be affected more directly by other factors, such as
economic restructuring or ill-considered wars.
A third objection has to do with developments after 2008. In this
paper, I have avoided discussion about the global financial crisis' impact
on deficits and debt. The crisis did cause a substantial deterioration in
public finances, but it is difficult to argue that this had much to do with
the sort of "democratic overload" that has preoccupied advocates of fiscal
rules. It was a massive market crash, rather than rent-seeking by
voters, politicians, and bureaucrats, that caused deficits after 2008. I
have also avoided any discussion about what the United States and
some other democracies have done (or rather, have failed to do) in
anticipation of rising expenditures on old-age programs and healthcare
in the next three decades. Some conservatives argue that the failure of
policymakers to grapple with this problem is a sign of the dysfunction of
American democracy.117 The scale of the problem is, indeed, daunting,
118
and the desire for an immediate and comprehensive response is
understandable. The experience of the last thirty years, however, has
shown us that U.S. democracy does not work that way.
116. For a skeptical view of the West's "crisis of legitimacy," see GILLEY, supra note 113,
at 19.
117. See FERGUSON, supra note 96, at 41-42 (arguing that U.S. voters are passing off
the cost of entitlement programs to future generations); MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE,
supra note 96, at 14-17 (Arguing that the United States and other Western democracies
are faced with a crisis of debt partially due to pension obligations).
118. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LONG-TERM FEDERAL BUDGET
SIMULATIONS: SPRING 2014 UPDATE (2014) (extrapolating what the fiscal budget and
deficit could potentially look like in the future).
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